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Determinants of Government Expenditure
THE subject of government expenditures has not received much or
satisfactory attention from economists or students of public finance. It
can hardly be said that he who wishes to study the subject finds the tools
of analysis necessary for the interpretation of public expenditure data
lying ready to hand. "The tremendous growth of government expenditures
here and abroad," says Lowell Harriss, "has been one of the striking
economic developments of recent years. Economic analysis of these
changes has dealt primarily with the probable effects on levels of employ-
ment and prices.... Onthe whole, however, the analytical results are
generally unsatisfactory. Economists specializing in public finance have
generally concentrated on taxation. Perhaps there is not much more that
the economist can say about spending. The nature of the problems,
especially the unavailability of bases for appraising results, make study
difficult. Description, and the statement of rather obvious generalities,
may about exhaust the possibilities."
This position cannot be accepted without misgiving. Economists like
to feel that their studies have a bearing upon issues of public policy, and
commonly pass judgment on such issues. But what significance can such
judgments have for a world in which government spending activities
frequently account for 25 to 40 per cent of community output, and the
characteristics of these activities go unexplained? We must surely seek
further insight if progress in other fields is not to be nullified by our
inadequacy in this one. Further, as explained previously, our purpose is to
evolve and to test against our data for Britain tentative hypotheses that
might be generally valuable for understanding the behavior of government
expenditures over time. A first and essential step must be to establish
hypotheses that seem worth the trouble of testing. With this in mind, we
devote the next section to those earlier writings which presumably
generated Harriss's pessimism.
The Study of Public Expenditures
THE WELFARE THEORIES
Historically, many economists have approached the study of public
expenditures from a prescriptive point of view; it was perhaps this group
more than any other that encouraged the comment quoted above. Such
studies attempt to set up criteria for the size and nature of government
1C.Lowell Harriss, "Public Finance," A Survey of Contemporary Economics, B. F. Haley,
ed., Homewood, Iii., 1958, II, 26 1—262. It should be pointed out that Harriss has done
much to remedy the deficiency. See, e.g., his "Government Expenditures: Significant
Issues of Definition," Journal of Finance, December 1954.
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expenditures and income by utilizing techniques usual in the study of
market economics.2 Starting from some concept of economic welfare,
defined in terms of individual choice, they attempt to specify the taxing
and spending activities of government that would conduce to the ideal
conditions of such welfare. At the extreme, this leads to proposals for
systems of public finance in which the government provides only the
services that individuals would pay for directly, if that were feasible,
and levies only such taxes as individuals would voluntarily pay in return
for the services they receive. This transference of the concepts of individual
choice in markets to the activities of government can lead to such peculiar
"liberal" suggestions as the proposition that those who are unwilling to
pay taxes in such a situation are "pathological."3
Alternatively, the government may be regarded by such writers as a
unitary being, with tastes and preferences like other beings. Its income
and expenditure can then be examined as those of an individual, and the
size and character of the public sector prescribed by the application of
marginal criteria similar to those generally employed, for instance, in
the study of individual consumers.4 Further sophistication can be intro-
duced by recognizing that people can "choose" to use the political process
rather than the market to make decisions about the utilization of econ-
omic resources. The political voting system is in this context an alternative
to the market voting system. This approach leads to consideration of
alternative political voting systems, but with a view primarily to the
discovery of what kind of system will best achieve the postulated objec-
tive: attainment of the "ideal" conditions of individual choice. The ideal
political system is thus regarded as one that best promotes economic
liberalism, and the ideal volume and type of government expenditure is
that which such a system would generate.4°
These theories all derive from, and to varying degrees depend upon,
the system of market analysis that is commonly known as welfare econom-
ics. There is considerable and growing skepticism among economists as
to the value of welfare economics as a basis for economic policy and as
a starting point for the study of actual economies. To the extent that
such skepticism is well founded, the associated theories of public expendi-
2Suchstudies have a long and continuing history. See R. A. Musgrave and A. T.
Peacock, eds., Classics in theTheoryof Public Finance, London, 1958, Introduction. In
recent years, there has been considerable discussion of the topic by P. A. Samuelson, S.
Enke, andJ. Margolis in the Review of Economics and Statistics (November 1954, May 1955,
November 1955, November 1958).
3F.Benham, "Notes on the Pure Theory of Public Finance," Economica, November
1934, p. 453.
A.C. Pigou, A Study in Public Finance, 3rd rev. ed., London, 1947, Part I, Chapter V.
A sophisticated discussion of political and market choices is to be found in J. M.
Buchanan and G. Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: A Preliminary Analysis of Individual
Constitutional Ghoice (forthcoming).
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ture must become more dubious. But this need not concern us here,
important though it may be in other contexts. What is more destructive,
from our point of view, is the fact that although these theories of govern-
ment income and expenditure purport to be prescriptive in nature, even
the most sophisticated of them (which do at least admit consideration of
voting systems) treat the problems of government and political behavior
in a fashion that any political scientist must consider unrealistic. No
government is concerned, as the theories imply, solely with interpreting
the choices of the individual members of the community. All governments
depend for their existence upon their power to coerce as well as upon the
consent of the governed, though the importance of these two ingredients
may vary from one country to another.
In short, governments have not in the past tried to achieve the aims
that the welfare theories postulate for them, and, however much we may
deplore the fact, they are unlikely to do so in the future. Consequently,
these prescriptive theories are simply not operational.
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
The development of Keynesian theories of economic stability has en-
couraged consideration of government expenditures as one element in a
macrostatic model. The more recent and growing interest in the associated
problems of economic dynamics and economic growth, a marked charac-
teristic of economic studies since World War II, has stimulated further
interest in public expenditures along similar lines.5 The work of this
second school is of particular interest from our point of view.
To be of value for our purposes, however, it is necessary that the
models of the growth theorists should incorporate some plausible and
realistic theory as to the relationship between the time evolution of public
expenditures and of other magnitudes of economic interest. There is no
point (even if there were a possibility) in trying to interpret the statistics
of actual public expenditures by reference to a model incorporating
assumptions about their evolution that have been dictated by analytical
convenience rather than by inherent plausibility. This is, of course, a
perennial problem, and its importance for this study is especially clear.
We may be able to use a theory of economic growth which incorporates
some explanation of the place of the public sector (and of public expendi-
tures in particular) in the general explanation of the economic growth
process, but we can do little with a theory which ignores the public sector
altogether, or treats it as an unfortunate nuisance to be got rid of by
global and unconvincing assumptions. In the words of Domar,". .. gov-
See, e.g., R. F. Harrod, Towards a Dynamic Economics, London, 1948; E. Lundberg,
Studies in the Theory of Economic Expansion, Stockholm, 1937; and E. Domar, Essays in the
Theory of Economic Growth, New York, 1957.
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ernment is the most troublesome of the three [forms of expenditure]
because we have no theory of government expenditure. In its absence we
may dump government expenditure on top of the other two as an
exogenous factor, merge it with consumer expenditure ... orassume it
away altogether. This last suggestion is certainly the most convenient of
all and such treatment of a troublesome factor is richly supported by
precedents in economic theory.."° For Domar, as for those who have
developed static Keynesian models, aggregate government expenditure is
either to be left outside the system of mutual determination of the econ-
omic model or assumed to be zero. Neither treatment is particularly
satisfactory. Government expenditure is clearly not usually nonexistent,
and it is implausible to argue that it neither influences economic growth
over time, nor is itself influenced by that growth.
More recently, some writers have tried to incorporate a more positive
theory of the public sector (including an explicit or implicit theory of
public expenditure) in long-period growth models.7 While these models
are certainly an improvement, from our point of view, on what went
before, it cannot be said that either their formulation or their present
degree of refinement makes them suitable for our immediate purpose.
The models cannot be discussed in detail here; it must suffice to point
out the general ways in which they continue to be unsuitable.8
It is possible to criticize such models, in the first place, on the ground
that the number of variables that they take into account is much smaller
than is necessary for their satisfactory utilization for purposes of economic
policy or for the interpretation of history. There are, for example, awkward
problems remaining to be tackled in relation to the treatment of transfer
payments and the effective incidence of taxes and public expenditures.
But other objections are of more significance in the present context. In
particular, the models cannot easily take care of changes in the coefficients
of the constituent variables, whether such changes are induced by the
process of growth itself or whether they result from historical eventualities
incapable of inclusion in a generalized economic growth model. This
difficulty has particular importance in the sphere of government: Can we
really expect either the character and determinants of government
Domar, op cit., p. 20.
SeeJ. 0. Gurley, "Fiscal Policy in a Growing Economy," Journal of the Political Economy,
December 1953, Pp. 523—535, with reply by Warren L. Smith, ibid., October 1954,
pp. 440—441; also Smith, "Monetary-Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth," Quarterly
Journal of Economics, February 1957, pp. 36—55, and A. Smithies, "The Control of In-
flation," Review of Economics and Statistics, August 1957, pp. 282—283. For a model of a
different order, see K. Kurihara, "Growth Models and Fiscal Policy Parameters,"
Public Finance, 1956, pp. 148—161.
8Afuller discussion of the problem is to be found in Alan T. Peacock, "The Public
Sector and the Theory of Economic Growth," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, February
1959.
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behavior, or the precise impact of that behavior upon the rest of the
economy, to remain constant over any long period of time?
It is the third group of objections to these models, however, which is
decisive from our point of view. Perhaps in order to cope with the diffi-
culties already described, growth models have been developed in the
direction, not of providing a more and more realistic picture of actual
economies, but rather towards providing more and more prescriptions for
the simplified societies described in the models themselves.9 Thus, a
typical procedure is to begin from some statement of objective (or simple
set of objectives) such as the maintenance of a prescribed stable rate of
economic growth. Then, using a model assuming, for example, the initial
absence of government activity, and postulating defined relationships
between a chosen group of variables, the necessary tax and expenditure
policies required to attain the defined objective are discovered. In other
words, the structure of the public sector is prescribed by the initial assump-
tions and characteristics of the defined model. The actual behavior of
governments is not considered, and often the question of whether the
objective is one which any government is likely to wish to pursue, or to
pursue exclusively, is also left aside. The alternative would be to try to
evolve a theory of the public sector from a study of the actual process
of decision taking at different levels of government and at different
periods of time and in different countries, and to incorporate the results
in a generalized growth model. It seems unlikely that such a procedure
would produce anything more than considerable distrust of models
incorporating a government sector. Nevertheless, failing some such study,
the growth models in their present form cannot be treated as anything
more than exercises in a technique of arrangement.
WAGNER'S LAW
There is another school of thought about public expenditures, also with
a long and continuing history, but explanatory rather than prescriptive
in character. Its aim is to establish generalizations about government
expenditures, not from postulates about the logic of choice, but rather
by direct inference from historical evidence. The approach is perhaps
better known on the continent of Europe than in Britain or the U.S., and
therefore requires rather full explanation. It was encouraged by a growing
awareness towards the end of the last century (i.e., at the beginning of our
period) of the correlative growth of community output and public ex-
penditure that was observed in a number of countries (e.g., Prussia,
Bavaria, Britain, North America, Switzerland). These countries had in
common a rising trend of output per head, but differed markedly in other
9 In this respect, at least, the growth theories are similar in essential character to the
welfare theories described earlier.
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important respects. Attempts were made to explain the phenomenon by
growing military and national debt commitments, but the increases in
expenditure affected too many other services, and the military and debt
commitments varied too much from one country to another for this to be
plausible. Consequently it came to be argued that the data supported the
existence of some kind of general "law" relating the growth of output per
head and the growth of government spending. Clearly, the existence and
character of any law of this kind, if it can be established, must be a matter
of importance for our study.
In general, economists writing at the turn of the century inferred no
more than that the available statistics suggested a "law" that government
expenditure must grow in proportion to a community's output per head.
This was the view of H. C. Adams, writing in America in 1898.10 In the
same period, however, Continental writers of the Younger Historical
School, and particularly Adolph Wagner, went further than this, arguing
that government expenditure must increase at an even faster rate than
output. Wagner's influence continues to pervade Continental writing on
problems of public expenditure. The core of his argument, in his own
words, is that "The law [of increasing state activity]is the result of
empirical observation in progressive countries, at least in Western
European civilization;its explanation, justification and cause is the
pressure of social progress and the resulting changes in the relative
spheres of private and public economy, especially compulsory public
economy. Financial stringency may hamper the expansion of state
activities, causing their extent to be conditioned by revenue rather than
the other way round, as is more usual. But in the long run the desire for
development of a progressive people will always overcome these financial
difficulties."
The first point of importance about this argument is its implication
that the growth in expenditure derives from the growth in state activity,
which is in itself the consequence of social progress. In other words,
Wagner's "law" is really a law of increasing state activity: to the extent
that such increased activity is the inevitable accompaniment of social
progress, and only to that extent, increased expenditures are inevitable
also. It is also clear from the quotation that the law is concerned with
the secular behavior of expenditure rather than with short-run change
or the actual processofchange. Further, Wagner does not suggest that
the actual extent of state activity can be fixed a priori. His concern is
with the rate of growth of expenditure; he cites as proof of his law the
fact that for a number of countries it was empirically verifiable that as
10H.C. Adams, The Science of Finance, New York, 1898, Chapter 2.
"Ado'ph Wagner, Finanzwissenschafi, Leipzig, 1890, 3rd ed., Part I, p. 16.
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output per head increased in the past, state activity and expenditure
grew more than proportionately.
To explain the existence of the law, Wagner distinguished between
three types of state activity. These were the maintenance and enforcement
of law and order internally and externally (Recht- und
roughly, the provision of the necessary social preconditions for markets
to function), participation in material production, and the provision of
such economic or social services as postal, education and banking services.
Separate reasons were adduced for expecting the law to hold for each
type of activity.
For the first group of activities, he suggests, the need for increased
participation by the state originates in the "inevitable" centralization of
administration and in the "atomization" of social and economic life
that result from economic development. At the same time, the state has
to increase its activities in order to ensure the maintenance and improve-
ment of the quality of the services it provides. Also, increasing division
of labor multiplies the complexities of economic life and hence the
possible causes of friction. Thus if the economy is to function efficiently,
state activities of both a preventive and a repressive character have to
increase. Growing state participation in material production (the second
type of state activity) develops because new technical processes (Wagner
was thinking particularly of steam power) make the public corporation
the only alternative to the joint stock company. In his view, it is a neces-
sary and a preferable alternative, because the joint stock companies
might not be able to handle large amounts of capital as effectively as a
public corporation, and because private enterprises mismanage and waste
capital during business cycles and enhance such cycles by causing specu-
lative disturbances. Finally, increased activity of the third type (provision
of other economic and social services) must arise where technical develop-
ments produce favorable conditions for monopolies, where the social
benefits Qf the service are not susceptible to economic evaluation (e.g.,
education), and, once again, where the state could become a source of
stability by taking over large enterprises whose dominating influence
encourages instability.
Wagner himself did not put forward his law as perpetual and ineluct-
able, like the law of gravitation. On the other hand, he did consider it
to be something more than a simple historical accident; he expected the
law to hold at least for the near future, that is, for at any rate some part
of the period of our study. So interpreted, the law isstill subject to
important criticisms. It is based upon historical evidence, but its accept-
ance as anything more than a statistical observation requires acceptance
also of Wagner's own very special view of the nature of the state as a
political entity. True, he adduces reasons why government expenditure
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will increase in any developing state, and some of these reasons are
technical in character and might be expected to operate whatever view
is taken of the role of the state. But these are only a part of his argument,
and would not alone justify the expectation that public expenditures
must always rise at a faster rate than community output. Further, careful
examination suggests that what appear to be simply technical reasons
for expenditure growth in Wagner's exposition are often not independent
of his views about the state. Thus, his most concrete proposition as to
the nature of the increased expenditures of government is the argument
from stabilization. At first sight, this has a surprisingly modern look, in
that subsequent developments in macroeconomics have encouraged the
view that a large public sector may be necessary for purposes of employ-
ment policy. This view is perhaps coming to be less widely held, at least
without considerable qualification; economists are indeed beginning to
treat the possible rigidities of public sector expenditures themselves as a
source of price and employment fluctuation.'2 In any case, Wagner's
argument is really very different from the more modern one. Certainly,
he believed that the creation of public corporations could help to reduce
instability. But he does not demonstrate why all countries must always
treat economic stability as an important aim of policy, and his basic
reason for expecting a growth in the importance of public corporations
lies elsewhere—in his own conviction of their general superiority to
private joint stock enterprise. Similarly, his assertion that other public
services must expand both qualitatively and quantitatively as output
rises stems not only from technical considerations, but also from Wagner's
view that it is the duty of the state to behave in this way.
It cannot be accepted, then, that Wagner succeeded in demonstrating
that a secular increase in community output must inevitably produce a
more than proportionate secular growth in the importance of government
services. Ultimately, the law of increasing government expenditure is a
corollary of the political philosophy and interpretation of history that
Wagner accepted. His "proof" of the existence of such a law, therefore,
depends upon the validity of the organic theory of the state upon which
he relies. But there are many other interpretations of the nature and
duties of the state, not demonstrably less valid than the views held by
Wagner. For example, J. Shield Nicholson was writing in Edinburgh in
1903: "In the progress of society, moreover, it is necessary to incur new
modes of expenditure. No provision of machinery to meet old wants will
suffice for the satisfaction of new demands. In many cases, however, the
expense ought to be met not by increased taxation, but by substitution.
With increase of wealth the increasing demands for education ought to
12See,for example, W.Drees,Jr., Onthe Level of Government Expenditure in Ihe Nether-
lands after the War, Leiden,1955.
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be partially met, at any rate, by diminished demands from the poor; as
the education rate rises, the poor rate ought to fall."3 Why should
Wagner's law operate in a country where such views might be accepted?
A Suggested Approach to the Study of Public Expenditures
We must now ask whether there is any alternative approach which might
be potentially more fruitful than those so far discussed, and we can use-
fully broach this question by considering first of all what is worthy of
retention in the existing approaches.
The preceding discussion suggests two general propositions from which
we might start out. First, insofar as we attempt to establish generaliza-
tions that we might expect to have validity for more than one country
(and which we can subsequently test against our sample of one), those
generalizations must inevitably be concerned with procedure rather than
prescription. Our aim should be to provide enlightenment as to how
public expenditures can be expected to behave, of a kind that might be
of value in the study of countries other than Britain, rather than to try
to compare the facts of expenditure growth with some "idealized" model.
That is, any general hypotheses should be concerned with the likely
characteristics of expenditure growth in actual communities, taking all
necessary account of the economic, political, and social differences
between one community and another.
Second, and arising partly out of the above, our broad approach must
follow that of Wagner rather than that more familiar to British and
American economists, since, like Wagner, we are concerned with the
actual facts of public expenditures. But we shall need to adapt and
modify this approach. It is also of relevance to this decision that the
available evidence for a number of European countries during the present
century does show a public expenditure growth of the character that
Wagner prophesied, and this has persuaded later writers (particularly
Continental writers) that his law continues to be valid. Indeed, as one
authority points out, the rate of growth of such expenditures in many
countries has been faster than Wagner himself would have expected.'4
This, and the fact that Wagner's argument certainly directs attention to
matters of real practical significance in the historical development of
public expenditures, suggests that dissatisfaction with the law as Wagner
argued it ought not to prejudice us against his general approach.
Further study along these lines, seeking the kind of hypotheses des-
cribed, and using Wagner's general approach while rejecting the conclu-
sions he reached by it, can take two directions. We can examine afresh
the possibility that there are permanent influences affecting government
13J. Shield Nicholson, Elements of Political Economy, London, 1903, p. 510.
14SeeG. Schmölders, Finanzpolitik, Berlin, 1955, Chapter IV, pp. 125—140.
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expenditure at all times and in all societies, and that these must generate
expenditure growth in developing societies, irrespective of their political
and social characteristics. This may help us to decide whether the search
for general hypotheses about government expenditure growth is either
plausible or useful, and should in any case indicate some influences on
expenditure that we cannot afford to ignore. At the same time, there is
no reason why we need confine our investigation to the relationship
(between the secular growth in government expenditure and in com-
munity output) that interested Wagner. A second direction for study is
suggested by the fact that even a superficial examination of the recent
history of public expenditures indicates other questions, a consideration
of which might possibly be productive of fruitful hypotheses. It is in
these two directions that our own approach evolves.
PERMANENT INFLUENCES ON GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES
In considering whether there are any permanent influences on the size
of public expenditures (i.e., forces operating continuously to affect the
size of such expenditures), we can suitably begin by some further examina-
tion of the consequences of the increasing complexity in economic life,
to which Wagner directed attention. It is certainly true, as he pointed
out, that as an economy develops the tasks of the organs and institutions
of the government (e.g., in making and enforcing laws, providing a police
force and an army, governing large towns) must both change in character
and become more intricate and difficult. This may well make for some
growth of government expenditure on those functions with economic
progress, and it is also likely to stimulate changes in the nature of the
responsibility for expenditure, as the efficient scale at which public acti-
vities of particular kinds can be carried on will change.'5 But the nature
and extent of the growth in government expenditure due to such causes
must depend upon the specific circumstances being considered. There is
no reason to believe, for example, that the impact of the development of
the internal-combustion engine and electric power has been of the same
character and importance from this point of view as the results of the use
of steam power of which Wagner wrote. Also, it must not be forgotten
that technical change affects not only the problems of fulfilling particular
tasks of government, but also the means available for the performance of
those tasks. Thus, whether a government which tries to maintain a given
level of services over a period of economic and technical change will
absorb an increasing share of community output as a result depends on
how the process of change affects the relative productivity of the resources
(including labor) used in the public and private sectors. There is no
reason to expect that relative productivities will change in the same
15SeeChapter 6.
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way in all societies at all times; this must be a matter for empirical
verification in each case.16 Consequently, there can also be no certainty
about the consequences of growing complexity, or of economic develop-
ment perse, forthe behavior of government expenditure; there is no
point in trying to adumbrate some general hypothesis that might be valid
for all times and places.
Analogous to questions of the effects on the cost of providing public
services of changes in the character of economic life, there are questions
raised by economic development on the demand side. Such development
makes available new forms of consumption, and it is possible and perhaps
likely that countries will want to indulge these in part by increasing
expenditure on government-financed communal consumption.For
example, insofar as a rising GNP is associated with the devotion of an
increasing proportion of consumption to services, there is some reason to
expect the share of government to increase. Services constitute an area in
which government provision may be efficient and in which private markets
may function unsatisfactorily, whether because of difficulties in making
charges, in assigning benefits to individuals, or in taking account of the
"community" (as distinct from individual) benefits to be obtained from
expenditures on such services as education. However, development also
brings with it at least one similar influence to reduce government expendi-
ture: the fact that as the general level of individual income rises, depend-
ence upon the state for the relief of extreme poverty and distress ought to
diminish in importance. On the other hand, it is plausible to argue that
the criterion of poverty and distress which determines who is to be
helped by the government, and how much, is not absolute but is3 within
broad limits, conventional. Attitudes may differ from society to society,
but there is likely to be a broad general relation between the standard
of life of a community and its views about a tolerable level of existence
to be provided I y the government for those in need. Further, the causes
of poverty and distress are likely to change radically as a society develops.
The nature, incidence, and problems, e.g., of unemployment may become
quite different. It appears to be even more difficult to make any positive
and general assertion about these "demand" influences on the level of
government spending than about the "cost" influences.
The influence of population change must also be considered. The total
output of a community can increase without output per worker rising,
as a result of population increases. Rising total output might well be
associated with constant or falling output per head and thus with an
increasing need. for government expenditures on services concerned with
16Foran empirical study of this kind, see Solomon Fabricant, assisted by Robert E.
Lipsey, The Trend of Government Activity in the United States since 1900, New York, NBER,
1952, Chapter 5.
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the relief of distress, and simultaneously with increasing difficulty in
transferring resources from the private to the public sector.17 In these
circumstances the relation between government expenditure and popu-
lation change is unlikely to be simple, predictable, or constant over
time or between societies. If on the other hand we restrict ourselves to
consideration of the effects of increasing output per head of population
(the definition of a developing economy implicit in much of our earlier
discussion), an increasing population becomes more likely to be associated
with rising total government expenditure, though not necessarily with
increasing expenditure per head. But the effects of population change
are still not easy to forecast even in this case, since government expendi-
ture is likely to be affected not only by changes in total numbers but also
by changes in the composition of population (number of pensioners,
children, and so on). Many types of expenditure are designed to meet
the needs of particular groups and tend to be affected by the numbers in
those groups rather than by the size of the population as a whole, and
there is no reason why the numbers in any group should vary directly
with total population.'8 The dangers of attempting to make any general
proposition become even more apparent when itis recognized that
changes in population almost inevitably follow an irregular time path,
whether we consider total numbers or detailed composition. Any general
expenditure "law", therefore, would either have to operate despite
population change or be restricted in relevance to the periods (if there
are any) in which trends in total numbers and in composition are broadly
constant. As a further complication, there is one particular relation be-
tween population and government spending which requires special
mention: where rising output per head and increasing population occur
together, there is often a simultaneous growth in the size and importance
of conurbations. This reinforces the argument that increased public
expenditures may be required to deal with the growing complexity of
economic activities. Also, the growth of urban populations may affect
the methods used by governments to control their expenditures and the
relationships between different types of public authority. Growing urban-
ization was in fact important during the period studied by Wagner, and
is relevant for our own period. Nevertheless, it is no basis for a general
law of expenditure, but rather a special influence that may or may not
be significant in any country or time period.
Similar difficulties are found when we turn, finally, to the influence of
17Thisis very likely to be the position, e.g., in a less developed country with a popu-
lation problem.
18Fora practical illustration of this point, see F. W. Paish and A. T. Peacock, "The
Economics of Dependence, 1952—82," Economica, November 1954, and Report of the
Committee of Enquiry into the Cost of the National Health Service, Command Paper 9663, 1956,
pp. 37-45; also Chapter 8 of this book.
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changes in prices and in the level of employment. Such changes may
indeed affect the volume and the pattern of public spending in some
circumstances. But since prices and the volume of unemployment can
either rise or fall, it is not easy to see how these factors could operate in a
secular fashion to create changes in the importance of government
expenditure; once again, a general law would have to operate despite
changes in these magnitudes, or be restricted to periods in which they
followed one simple trend.
The diversity and complexity of these possible general influences upon
public expenditures is apparent, and we do not believe that the factors
just discussed exhaust the possibilities. But there certainly do not seem
to be any permanent influences upon government spending capable of
supporting the assertion contained in Wagner's law, or of suggesting
some general hypothesis that might be expected to explain the behavior
of government expenditures through time. The most definite general
statement that it might be possible to make on the basis of our examina-
tion of these permanent influences is that government expenditures are
perhaps more likely than not to increase in absolute real volume as a
country develops economically. Also, it is quite possible that the rise of'
expenditures will be at least as fast as the secular rate of increase of
national product. But there is nothing inevitable about this; not all the
consequences of development encourage such a rate of growth of public
spending. In fact, the behavior of public expenditures over any period
depends on factors that can differ in influence and importance from one
time to another and between one country and another. Further, we must
add an additional (and fundamental) argument, so obvious as to need
no discussion: changes in the size of the government sector and hence of
public expenditures are bound to be affected by the political nature of
the society concerned and by current views about the role of government.
We have discovered no reason why the general influences arising out of
economic and other change should be expected to reduce these political
factors to unimportance.
In sum, we must clearly not ignore the permanent influences on expen-
ditures which were so important to Wagner, but neither must we expect
them to give rise to general hypotheses about public expenditures in
general, or even to provide a complete explanation of the facts in any
country over any particular period.
THE DISPLACEMENT EFFECT AND THE CONCENTRATION PROCESS
Both the secular character and the "historical inevitability" of Wagner's
law make difficulties for the development of ideas about government
expenditure that will be useful in considering shorter-term questions.
Having abandoned the law, though without denying the importance of
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many of the characteristics of government expenditure to which it draws
attention, we can pursue these other ideas more freely. In doing so, we
shall be attempting less than Wagner but may achieve more, at least of a
practical nature. We must seek, not universal secular laws, but a way of
looking at the year-to-year changes in government spending that will not
only illuminate the British statistics which are our direct concern, but
also give us an approach to the subject that might be equally fruitful in
studying other countries or periods, in interpreting the facts of history
or in introducing realism into the discussion of present and future expendi-
ture policies.
As a first step, let us consider some broad facts about the expenditures
of Western governments during this century, concerning ourselves not
with secular trends but rather with the precise fashion in which the actual
changes have taken place. One immediately evident fact is that while
government expenditure has clearly grown (at least in money terms) over
the period as a whole for all countries for which adequate statistics are
available, the time pattern of growth is less regular than, and quite
different from, the corresponding pattern of growth in the size of com-
munity output. An inspection of Chart I (Chapter 3) makes this clear
for Britain, and evidence is available of a similar pattern of change in
other countries.19
The previous quotation from Wagner indicates that he was aware of
at least one possible reason for these divergent time patterns—the depend-
ence of governments upon revenues raised by taxation.20 But it was not
a question that he was interested in pursuing, as his concern was with
the secular trend of expenditures and he did not believe these to be
affected by the short-run problems of raising revenue. If we are to con-
cern ourselves also with short-run phenomena, however, we must con-
sider the reasons for the time pattern of expenditure growth with more
care. Typically, the time chart of government money expenditures
describes a series of mountain ranges, with peaks of increasing height
separated by plateaus. In the British case, the major peaks occur in the
periods covered by the two world wars. There is, of course, obvious
reason to expect the share of community output taken by the government
to rise in wartime; the divergence in the time patterns of the two series
under discussion would be of little interest if it could be attributed simply
to this. In fact, it cannot. Although British government expenditure
declines after the wars, it does not return to the prewar level, and a
SeeSchmölders, op cit.; and for information on the U.S., see M. Slade Kendrick,
A Century and a Half of Federal Expenditures, Occasional Paper 48, New York, NBER,1955.
20Torepeat part of that quotation (in the section of this chapter on Wagner's law):
"Financial stringency may hamper the extension of state activities, causing their extent
to be conditioned by revenue rather than the other way round...."
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similar pattern is to be observed in other countries similarly affected. In
Britain, the plateaus of expenditure establish themselves at successively
higher levels, and the share of government expenditure in national
product remains much greater after the wars than it was immediately
before them.
To provide a satisfactory explanation of this time pattern of govern-
ment expenditures, we must begin with some kind of concept of the
nature and behavior of governments. We should then be able to interpret
the relevant historical phenomena of any period in the light of this
conception, and so obtain an understanding of the changing magnitude
of public expenditures. It is one thing, however, to criticize a political
philosophy such as that used by Wagner, and quite another to provide
a coherent statement that will stand in its place. In this respect, fortu-
nately, we can profit from the more limited nature of the task we have
set ourselves; we do not need a theory of government that will describe
the character of public expenditures fifty years from now, but require
only a sufficient understanding of the governmental process to provide
insight into the year-to-year behavior of public spending. For this more
limited purpose, we believe that some fairly simple propositions, certainly
not sophisticated enough to be called a philosophy, will suffice.
We start from the trite but important observation to which Wagner
himself has directed attention: that government expenditure depends
broadly on revenues raised by taxation. That is, decisions about such
expenditure are influenced or controlled through the ballot box, or by
the use of whatever other media exist for citizens to bring pressure to bear
upon their government. Now, these political choices differ from choices
made through markets. It is inherent in the nature of choices made
through the political process that the ideas of citizens as to what is desir-
able public expenditure can be separated from the ideas of those same
citizens as to the reasonable burden of taxation. Clearly, both the views
that citizens hold and their influence on government policy will be affected
by the political organization of the society concerned. But while, for
example, a dictatorship and a democracy with regular free elections may
differ in this respect, no government is likely to act without any consid-
eration at all of the views of its citizens. Thus, the divergence of the
"revenue" and "expenditure" ideas of citizens is of potential relevance
as a means of explaining the time pattern of government expenditure
growth in a large number of societies.
When societies are not being subjected to unusually violent pressures
or disturbances, people's ideas about the "tolerable" burden of govern-
ment taxation tend to be fairly stable. Governments may of course have
plans that would increase their expenditures, and the plans may be
thought desirable by many of the citizens. Nevertheless, their implementa-
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tion, and thus the rate of growth of government expenditure, will depend
upon the view taken by the government as to the revenues that it is
(politically) able to raise as well as upon its own views as to the desirability
of increasing government expenditures in any direction.2' Consequently,
government expenditure may rise in such periods, but if so it will do so at
a steady and relatively unspectacular rate, curbed by such economic
factors as the disincentive effects of high marginal rates of tax and also
by popular notions of tolerable tax burdens and by the degree of political
control exercised by the citizens over their government, but encouraged
by a rising output per head.22 Also, both citizens and government may,
throughout such periods, hold divergent views about the desirable size of
public expenditures and the possible level of government taxation.
This divergence can be adjusted by social disturbances that destroy
established conceptions and produce a displacement effect. People will
accept, in a period of crisis, tax levels and methods of raising revenue
that in quieter times they would have thought intolerable, and this
acceptance remains when the disturbance itself has disappeared.23 As a
result, the revenue and expenditure statistics of the government show a
displacement after periods of social disturbance. Expenditures may fall
when the disturbance is over, but they are less likely to return to the old
level. The state may begin doing some of the things it might formerly
have wanted to, but for which it had hitherto felt politically unable to
raise the necessary revenues. At the same time, social disturbances may
themselves impose new and continuing obligations upon a government, as
the aftermath of the disturbance (for example, the provision by a govern-
ment of war pensions), as the result of the government being obliged by
the disturbance to assume functions that it cannot easily return to others
(for example, the wartime provision by government of services formerly
financed by private charity), and as a consequence of changed ideas
induced or encouraged by the disturbance itself.
We do not suggest that there is some absolute sense in which social
disturbances "cause" changes in the economic activities of government.
This would patently be too simple a view. It should be clear from the
21.Wedo not of course suggest that the idea of a "customary" concept of taxable
capacity is a completely novel one. See, for example, the interesting discussion in J. C.
Stamp, Wealth andTaxable Capacity,London, 1922, Chapter IV.
22Arising real GNP per head brings increasing tax yields with constant tax rates,
so that if people's ideas of tolerable burdens are concerned with tax rates rather than
total payments, this provides a reason why the peacetime plateau described by public
expenditures may have an upward slope. Clearly, a progressive tax system may further
encourage this possibility.
23The1950 British budget, for example, involved a tax burden that would have
been unthinkable to a prewar government or electorate. Yet there was no serious argu-
ment for a return to the prewar situation: the social disturbances of World War II had
created a new set of norms, broadly accepted by both citizens and political parties.
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discussion so far that we recognize other permanent influences that may
be of importance (though these seem unlikely to operate in a constant
direction over time), and also the possible importance of changing social
ideas for the growth (or decline) in the functions of government. Thus,
it is possible to find peacetime periods (for example, just before World
War I) when the rate of growth of British government expenditures was
such that if it had continued steadily until 1955 the share of government
in community output would not have been markedly different from what
it was in fact. But this is the world of "might have been"; we do not
know what would have happened to British public expenditures had the
wars not happened, nor do we know how one can usefully speculate
about such a matter. We must concern ourselves with the facts. In Britain
during the period under study, those facts cannot be explained without
consideration of social disturbances, and there are persuasive politico-
economic reasons why this should be generally so.
Interpretation of our expenditure data, then, must take both kinds of
influence into account. Changes in social and political ideas and institu-
tions, as such, may condition the evolution of the functions of government,
and may also affect the nature and significance for public expenditures
of such social upheavals as wars. Conversely, the displacement effect may
be the origin of lasting changes in ideas and institutions; periods of war
are, for example, a fruitful source both of new ideas about society and of
new administrative procedures. Interpretation is consequently complex;
we wish neither to argue that the displacement effect alone explains the
evolution of the public sector nor to ignore its significance. Instead we
attempt an interpretation of what happens in periods of displacement
against a background of history that takes the other influences continu-
ously into account. It is only in this way that we can hope to turn the
Wagnerian thesis into an approach offering greater insight into the time
process and socioeconomic characteristics of expenditure growth.
It must also be made clear that we do not suggest that the displacement
effect must inevitably be upward, though we shall find that it has in fact
always been so in Britain in our period. Other things apart, such a propo-
sition would imply the inevitability of eventual complete state control of
economic activity. This possibility might itself produce social upheavals
intended to produce a reduction in the power of government and hence
a downward displacement in government expenditure. All we suggest,
therefore, is that in communities and over periods in which the economic
activities of the state are in fact increasing in importance and in which
social disturbances occur, the nature of political power will usually produce
a time pattern of growth characterized by a displacement effect of the
kind described.
Loosely associated with the displacement effect, but distinct from it,
28DETERMINANTS OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE
is a subsidiary characteristic of government expenditure to which some
indirect reference has already been made. The process of economic
growth carries with it certain influences tending to change the size of the
government unit upon which responsibility for public economic activities
rests. This change in the division of responsibilities we call here the
concentration process (see Chapter 6).
The economic factors making for change in the effective responsibility
for particular public sector activities can be fairly easily stated, although
their consequences may be less easy to trace. It is characteristic of econ-
omic development that it carries with it, and indeed depends upon,
improvements in the ease of transport and communication, and that this
is very likely to be associated also with a growth in the technically efficient
size of economic and administrative units. Thus, the process of growth
may generate two kinds of pressure for the movement of responsibility
for public expenditures toward higher (larger) organs of government.
First, the very fact of improved transport and communications, by
increasing the knowledge of particular groups about the mode of life and
standards of public service enjoyed elsewhere in the community, is likely
to generate pressures for improved and uniform standards of public
services, and these pressures may only be capable of satisfaction by
greater centralization ol' control over the size and character of public
spending. Second, the improvements in transport and communications
may not only make such larger areas of control possible, but may also
make them economically efficient. There can be scale economies in public
as well as private economic activities, and such economies may be gener-
ated for both by the process of economic growth.
On the other hand, while economic growth may produce social pressures
for uniformity of standards, there are other social pressures tending in
the opposite direction. The lower levels of government (whether the
creation of the central government as in Britain or units in a federal
structure as in the United States and Canada) are themselves political
units, with a history and a tradition. They cannot be expected to sur-
render their authority easily, and in many countries, both federal and
unitary, the pressure to preserve local autonomy is important politically
at both the central and local government levels. At the same time, the
historical development of local governments usually leaves them with
wide responsibilities of varying character. Changes in these different
activities cannot be expected to be uniform, so that any concentration
process that does occur must affect different local functions in very
different fashions. It may do so in a variety of ways: by the higher levels
of government taking the greater share of responsibility for the expanding
types of government expenditure, by the shift of responsibility for particu-
lar services from lower to higher authorities, by lower authorities losing
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effective autonomy because they become more dependent upon the
higher authority as a source of revenue, and by the creation of new
authorities under the broad control of central government to deal with
such problems as urban conurbations or the provision of particular
services such as water supply.
This concentration process can occur independently of any displace-
ment effect, but we should expect to find some relation (though not a
precise or straightforward one) between the two. In the first place, we
have seen that the concentration process (or its absence) in any period
must be regarded as the outcome of socioeconomic and political forces
which may be pulling in opposite directions. During periods of social
upheaval such as wars the political opposition to change is weakened,
and the pressures for concentration can break through. At the same
time, an event such as war has different impacts at the central and the
subordinate levels of government. The central authority assumes respons-
ibility for the prosecution of the war, and it is consequently at the central
level that new tax revenues (which are the basis for the later permanent
growth of the public sector) are concentrated. This must imply a relatively
faster growth in central functions, in the absence of a deliberate decision
to hand over new responsibilities for expenditures to local governments
after the disturbance is over. Further, the needs of war become more
important than such issues as local autonomy, and abrogations of local
independence are tolerated that would have been unacceptable at other
times. Once the change has been made, it is easier to make it permanent,
and such a step may indeed become unavoidable.24 Finally, the periods
of disturbance may (though they need not) be characterized by a social
cohesion that reinforces, among other things, the demand for uniform
standards of public services. The result of this will of course depend
upon the country concerned and upon its state of economic development;
it must always encourage a concentration of responsibilities at higher
levels, but whether the concentration will be at the center or at some
intermediate level must depend upon particular conditions.
ANALYTICAL PROCEDURE
The concept of a displacement effect can be used as the basis for a
general and systematic approach to the analysis and interpretation of
government expenditure statistics. It provides a focus of attention that is
lacking in other treatments of the problem, in that we can explain changes
in the importance of government expenditure through time by examining
what happens to government spending over periods of displacement.
This is not to say that general or secular factors in expenditure growth
24InBritain, the transfer of local government responsibility for hospital services to an
independent authority after World War II illustrates this point.
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must be ignored; our earlier discussion was intended to demonstrate not
that these factors were unimportant, but that their influence was not
constant or predictable through time in a fashion that would enable them
to be used as the basis for a general law of public expenditure. Indeed, it
is clear that the approach now being suggested must begin with a system-
atic examination of the influences affecting government expenditure
more or less permanently. Until we have discovered how such influences
affect the expenditure pattern during our period, we cannot be sure
either that a displacement effect exists independently of them or that
we know which social disturbances appear to have been productive of
expenditure displacements sufficiently important for detailed study.
We must begin, then, by considering government expenditure as a
whole, from both a secular and a shorter-run point of view, and in rela-
tion to the behavior of those influences upon expenditure that must
operate in a more or less permanent (but not constant) fashion. In the
preceding section, we indicated three such influences that are always
likely to be both relevant and capable of statistical interpretation:
population, prices, and the level of employment.
It has already been pointed out that the secular relation between
population changes and government expenditure is complex and un-
certain. But we can be fairly sure that the rate of population change is
unlikely to account for large short-period displacements in the general
level of government spending.25 In the case of Britain, we should not
expect population movements to be responsible for the peak-and-plateau
pattern of government expenditure statistics, or to provide the reason
why the peaks should occur in wartime. Nevertheless, it is necessary to
assess the influence of population on expenditure over our period by com-
puting government expenditure per head. In this way, we can not only
confirm the irrelevance of population as a factor in displacement, but also
obtain a supplementary measure of the changing significance of govern-
ment expenditure of a kind that is especially relevant to consideration of
the importance of such expenditure to the individual citizen.
The relation between price changes and displacement is less easy to
assess. True, we can deflate our current expenditure statistics by price
indexes and so discover whether displacements occur in the "real"
expenditure data so derived. But we cannot rule out the possibility that
changing prices may themselves have affected the government's problems
in raising revenues or deciding upon expenditures, and so have influenced
expenditure statistics over time. As one example, a consequence of
inflation is to increase money incomes. If a country's tax system is progres-
Thereare exceptions—for example, when large-scale migrations and frontier adjust-
ments, or both, result in rapid and radical population changes such as those characteristic
of Western Germany since the Second World War.
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sive, then even if tax rates remain unchanged during inflation, the real
burden of direct taxes on individuals must increase, and this may increase
the share of community product absorbed by government. The extent
to which inflation in this way releases a government from the "bonds of
the revenue" will depend upon the extent to which citizens think in
terms of real sacrifices, tax rates, or actual money tax payments. If there
is any "money illusion" in the tax attitudes (as is likely), inflation will
enable the rate of increase of the share of government in total output to
be faster than it could otherwise be, so making expenditure plateaus
steeper. Indeed, it is not difficult to conceive of inflation being responsible
for a very rapid change in the share of output going to government—
that is, for a displacement effect. First, inflation provides an emergency
reason for increasing tax burdens, as a means of curbing the price rise,
and so may facilitate subsequent acceptance of a higher permanent
level of government income and expenditure. Second, a runaway infla-
tion, involving complete loss of confidence in the existing currency and
its eventual withdrawal, clearly constitutes a break in the social pattern
as distinct as that made by war. This second phenomenon has not affected
Britain during our period, although we cannot leave the first entirely out
of account when considering developments since 1945. But it is perhaps
an indication of the utility of our approach that it would at once direct
attention to the importance of a possible displacement influence of
inflation in the study of, for instance, German or French government
expenditures during the same period.
The influence of changes in the level of unemployment is also not
obvious. At first glance, it might seem that we could treat the level of
employment as being reflected in the level of prices, in which case it
might not merit separate consideration. But the relation between price
changes and changes in unemployment is not simple, and in any case the
influence of unemployment on government expenditure is quite distinct
from the influence of price changes. In contrast to the latter, the major
influence of unemployment on spending is a direct one; the unemployed
receive money benefits from the government, either because unemploy-
ment qualifies them for benefits or because it reduces them to poverty
and so entitles them to relief, or for both these reasons. There is thus
likely to be a direct relation between the volume of unemployment and
the size of expenditures for these special purposes, although it may be
difficult to verify the extent to which payments are made for relief of
poverty rather than for unemployment perSe. Ofcourse, the extent to
which unemployment generates public expenditure will depend upon
policies that vary between countries and over time. Also, an increase in
this part of expenditure does not necessarily imply a similar increase
in total spending. A government may increase its expenditures, both on
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the unemployed and for other purposes, as a deliberate policy for the
reduction of unemployment. On the other hand, it may be more interested
in avoiding an increase in the tax burden, and look for ways of cutting
other spending when expenditure on unemployment increases. Both
attitudes (there are of course others) have been important in Britain
during our period.
As with inflation, it is also conceivable for unemployment to generate
a displacement effect, if itis sufficiently calamitous to cause radical
changes in accepted ideas about the role of government. The unemploy-
ment of the early 1930's in the United States may well have had such an
effect. We shall have to consider whether this was so in Britain or whether
the effects of unemployment on government expenditure were more
temporary, disappearing when the unemployment disappeared.
When these secular influences have been studied, it will be sufficiently
clear whether or not any displacement pattern in the statistics of govern-
ment money expenditures can plausibly be accounted for by them, or
whether there remain periods of displacement that demand explanation
in other terms. If the latter is the case, we must turn for further under-
standing to a consideration of more transient influences and to our
propositions about the political characteristics of the expenditure behavior
of governments. We should expect if our approach has any validity to
find that the periods in which we are now interested are periods in
which the continuity of community lifesuffered serious disruption.
Such disruptions should not be difficult to identify, and we can begin
this part of our analysis by considering whether the disruption itself
had any direct effect on government spending and, if so, whether that
effect could have continued outside the immediate period of disturbance,
so helping to explain the displacement in the expenditure plateaus.
This involves examination of the effects on British government expen-
diture of the two world wars, which is a less straightforward task than
might at first appear. Direct expenditures on the prosecution of war can
be identified within broad limits, and they are of course limited to the
period of war. We may by study of these expenditures account for the
wartime expenditure peaks. But we must recognize that this is not the
only consequence of war for government expenditure. Wars generate
commitments that continue into peace: debt commitments, war pensions,
and so on. The idea that increasing government expenditure derives from
increasing national debt, and hence from war, is by no means new;
Wagner, for example, considered this possibility but rejected it. We must
discover whether the continuing peacetime expenditures that resulted
directly from the wars will entirely account for the "displacement" of
postwar expenditures to plateaus higher than the prewar ones. If so,
we need look no further for an explanation of the nature of the displace-
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ment effect during our period. Also, it will be useful to consider the
influence of peacetime defense expenditures; these are clearly not the
direct consequence of war, but they are hardly a normal peacetime
expenditure.
This brings us to our final possibility. Any part of the displacement
effect that still remains to be explained must be the result of the influence
of the social disturbance on government behavior, either in making it
possible for the government to implement existing plans or in changing the
views of the government and the citizens, or both, about desirable levels
of public spending. Assessment of what things were important to this
process must be in some part a qualitative matter and dependent upon
description. But we can facilitate interpretation by analyzing government
expenditure statistics by groups, and particularly by economic and func-
tional categories. At the same time, if we are to keep the displacement
effect in perspective in relation to other relevant influences, we must also
form a view of the extent to which the public sector has been changing
from a "participating system" to a "control system"26 and whether there
have been changes in the character of government making control of public
expenditure less easy and the effects of displacement consequently more
striking. We can also examine expenditures at different levels of govern-
ment (using the concentration concept to interpret the statistics) and
review the spending activities of important public bodies falling outside
the official public sector (in the case of Britain, the nationalized industries).
Theseterms are explained in Chapter 5.
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